知識論專題：理性

教 學 目 標

本課程經由閱讀相關的重要論文來介紹與理性相關的主題，如理由，規範性等。學生修習本課程後將可對理性相關議題有初步的掌握，以作為日後深入研究相關議題的基礎。

授 課 綱 要

本課程內容分成三部分。第一部份主要探討理性與理由的相關性議題，主要閱讀文獻為Bernard Williams的經典論文”Internal and External Reasons”及數篇相關的討論文獻。第二部份探討理性與規範性的相關議題，將閱讀包括John Broom, John Horty等學者的論文。第三部份探討所謂高階規範性的問題將閱讀包含Putnam等哲學家的論文。

課 程 進 度

Week 1: Introduction

Week 2: Williams (1981)

Week 3: Hooker (1987) & Korsgaard (1986)

Week 4: Williams (1995a)

Week 5: McDowell (1995) & Williams (1995b)

Week 6: Scalnon (1998) & Williams (2001)

Week 7: Broom (1999)

Week 8: Broom (2004)

Week 9: Finlay (2007)

Week 10: Bonevac (1998)

Week 11: Horty (2007)

Week 12: von Fintel & Iatridou (manuscript)

Week 13: Putnam (1981), Ch 8

Week 14: Putnam (1981), Ch 9

Week 15: Kolodny (2005)

Week 16: Broom (2007)

Week 17: Broom (forthcoming)

教 科 書 及參 考 書 目

1. Bernard Williams (1981), "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.

2. Brad Hooker (1987), "Walliams' Argument against External Reason," Analysis, 47, 42-44.

3. Cristine Korsgaard (1986), "Skepticism about Practical Reason," The Journal of Philosophy, 83, 5-25.

4. Bernard Williams (1995a), "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 35-45.

5. John McDowell (1995), "Might There be External Reasons?," in Ross Harrison and J.E. Altham (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68-85.

6. Bernard Williams (1995b), "Reply toMcDowell," in J. Altham and Ross Harriso (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press, pp. 186-194.

7. Elijah Millgram (1996), “Williams’ Argument Against External Reasons,” Nous 30, 197-220.

8. T. M. Scanlon (1998), "Appendix: Williams on Internal and external Reasons," in T. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 363-373.

9. Bernard Williams (2001), "Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, The MIT Press, pp. 91-97.

10. Mark Shelton (2004), "What is Wrong with External Reasons?," Philosophical Studies 117, 365-394.

11. John Broom (1999), “Normative Requirements,” Ratio, 12, pp. 398–419.

12. John Broom (2004), “Reasons,” in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, Samuel Scheffler and Philip Pettit, Oxford University Press, pp. 28–55.

13. Stephen Finlay (2007), “Oughts and Ends,” Philosophical Studies.

14. Daniel Bonevac (1998), “Against Conditional Obligation,” Nous, 32, 37-53.

15. John Horty (2007), “Reasons as Defaults,” Philosophers' Imprint, 7, no. 3.

16. Kai von Fintel & Sabine Iatridou (manuscript), “What to Do If You Want to Go to Harlem: Anankastic Conditionals and Related Matters”.

17. Hilary Putnam (1981), Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press, Ch 8 and Ch 9.

18. Niko Kolodny (2005), “Why be Rational,” Mind, 114, 509-563.

19. John Broom (2007), “Wide or narrow scope?,” Mind, 116, 359–70.
20. John Broom (forthcoming), “Is rationality normative?,” forthcoming in Disputatio.

評 量 方 式

1. 課程參與及報告： 40%
2. 期末報告： 60%